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The post-cold war era presented security challenges that at one level are a continuation of the 
cold war era; at another level, these phenomena manifested in new forms. Whether the issues 
of economics and trade, transfer of technologies, challenges of intervention, or humanitarian 
crisis, the countries of the South (previously pejoratively labelled “Third World” or “developing” 
countries) have continued to address these challenges within the framework of their capabilities 
and concerns. The volume explores defence diplomacies, national security challenges and 
strategies, dynamics of diplomatic manoeuvers and strategic resource management of Latin 
American, southern African and Asian countries.
This path-breaking work is a fresh addition to the comparative literature on defence and security 
studies that links concepts and cases, giving voice to scholars related to the Global South and not 
to the Western powers. Emphasising history, political economy, the military, (human) security and 
politics, contributors to this innovative volume demonstrate ‘how the past reappears because 
it is a hidden present’, to paraphrase novelist Octavio Paz. A capita selecta of case studies and 
dialogue engendered thereby hold much promise for academic researchers, theorists, expert 
practitioners, security and political practitioners, policymakers and students. Apart from 
comparative potential, the analyses reflect a purposeful blend of theory, history and substance 
– indeed a worthy and valuable venture in current times. 
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China in a Global World
Ian Liebenberg and Justin van der Merwe
Abstract
This chapter provides an overview of the growth of China as a political, military and economic power since its emergence as an 
independent communist state in 1949. China became a notable political force during the era of decolonisation (1950‑1980) 
and one of the leading states within the Non‑Aligned Movement (NAM). Due to its relative economic development and 
substantial population, China became well‑known for posing alternatives to Western domination. During the era of 
decolonisation, China’s external involvement increased through its use of soft power and as a result of its support for liberation 
movements in Africa. The end of the Cold War saw the demise of the bipolar world and resulted in unipolarity. More recently, 
however, multipolarity has taken root through the rise or resurgence of non‑Western emerging powers. Since 1990, and 
especially since 2000, China has moved from being a regional hegemon to a global power. This chapter describes the rise of 
China and its current status as an aspiring global hegemon. Although the chapter is mainly descriptive, it also provides some 
reflective and analytical notes on China’s current and conceivable future role on the international stage. 
Background
The Washington Conference of  1921/1922 recognised China’s sovereignty and indepen­
dence. From 1922, the area now known as China experienced violent Western colonial 
interventions, civil war, and contesting “Republics”, before the emergence of  the 
communist People’s Republic of  China in 1949, which became a notable power in the 
Global South. China grew in stature in global politics between the 1960s and 1990s, 
growth which accelerated from 2000. Today, it is one of  the undisputed global political 
and economic powers. 
The rise of  modern China represents a unique historical trajectory. The Chinese civilisation 
went through tumultuous periods and several changes, ranging from the early rise of 
interactive communities (3000 BCE) and the Shang/Yin settlements (1700­112 BCE), 
through several dynasties such as the Chou and Ch’in period (1100­221 BCE), the Ch’in 
Empire (221­206 BCE), and the Han Dynasty. After the demise of  the Han Empire, the 
Wei, Shu Han and Wu dynasties were overtaken by the Sui and T’ang dynasties (circa 
500­756 CE). The Sturm und Drang that led to the creation of  today’s geographical region 
of  China foreshadowed what was to come. 
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Over these periods of  new orders supplanting or surpassing old ones, unique forms 
of  writing, bureaucracy, legislation, and military organisation (including conscription) 
evolved. From 1211, periods of  Mongol rule were interspersed with the growth of  a 
gradually unifying China. Systems of  administration developed, trade flourished, and 
literature and culture bloomed through both long­term internal developments and some 
infusion from outside, until the Mongols were driven out around 1400. The centralised 
rule and extensive (centralised) bureaucracies that have become key features in modern 
China began to develop in this period. The Ming dynasty brought further developments 
and unification, and the aims of  foreign policy at the time were for the centralised 
state to maintain the security of  a (presumably) uniting China, prevent further Mongol 
interference, and to retain and expand trade channels.
Gavin Menzies suggests that, following the expulsion of  the last of  the Mongols, Emperor 
Zhu Di built up an army of  nearly a million and brought Japan and Korea under Chinese 
influence, and some would argue that this already augured well for a greater China. Zhu 
Di also dispatched a large armada of  merchant and battleships, initiating a maritime 
tradition that was to grow significantly in the years to come (Menzies, 2003). Regarding 
grey diplomacy, these ambitious maritime ventures certainly brought China into the 
international picture as far back as the middle of  the 1400s, if  only briefly. The Ch’in 
dynasty marked further cultural growth.
In his work, Africa in History, Basil Davidson points out that trade between Africa, China 
and India developed between 900 and 1300 CE (Davidson, 2001:114, 193). The rise of 
Islamic expansion also played a role here (Davidson, 2001:72, 193). By the 1400s, trade 
between the East Coast of  Africa and the Far East was well­established, though it was 
soon to be interrupted and violently taken over by the Portuguese (Davidson, 2001:194). 
The decline of  the dynasties in China introduced the ‘Western Challenge’ or Western 
intervention from 1839 onwards.
As mentioned, the Washington Conference of  1921/1922 signalled the West’s formal 
recognition of  China’s status. Despite international recognition, the country was to 
experience leadership and military rivalries, Japanese aggression, internal and external 
strife, and a civil war that lasted from 1945 to 1949. In 1949, a Chinese communist 
government came to power under Mao Zedong. The Nationalist forces withdrew to 
Taiwan and declared a republic, despite mainland China viewing it as merely a belligerent 
province. This remains a contentious international issue to this day.
In Beijing, a red star rises
Following the establishment of  the People’s Republic in mainland China in 1949, 
development and socio­economic transformation were both expected and demanded by 
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the Chinese people, and the political leadership that created these expectations had to 
address the pressing questions of  modernisation, industrialisation and large­scale land 
reform. The decades 1949 to 1979 saw many developments, as the country experienced 
(sometimes contradictory) political developments, experiments in policy, intense 
leadership clashes, and elements of  Soviet­style five­year plans. The period was also 
marked by economic policies that swung from a focus on industrialisation to land reform 
for the peasant population. The Hundred Flowers campaign (1956­1957) opened up 
criticism of  Mao and brought great political turmoil. However, Mao survived. The Great 
Leap Forward saw attempts to build a rural industry, ending more in disaster than success 
(Service, 2007:331ff.), but Mao’s image remained largely intact despite public criticism 
(Service, 2007:334). The so­called Cultural Revolution that arose with Mao’s tacit consent, 
had to be reined in by the Chairman himself  by 1969 (Service, 2007:339).
Despite these upheavals, during the 1950s, together with the Soviet Union, China 
represented a rising ‘Red Danger’ for the (liberal) capitalist West or its allies. The latter 
formed a military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while a 
Russo­Chinese treaty signed in February 1950 brought together the People’s Republic of 
China and the Soviet Union. Other treaties signed during the visit of  Zhou Enlai (Chou 
En­lai) to Moscow in 1952 further cemented these ties, and China soon announced its first 
five­year plan along the lines of  a Soviet model (Calvocoressi, 1982:54). The Korean War 
during the 1950s seemed to draw China and the Soviet Union closer together and created 
greater distance from the United States (US) and its allies (Calvocoressi, 1982:58­60). The 
Cold War was in full swing. 
However, relations between the Soviet Union and China were strained, despite their shared 
commitment to international communism. Calvocoressi suggests that, by 1956/1957, the 
relationship was ‘ruffled by suspicion and friction’ due to differences in strategy on how 
to spread the communist ideology abroad. The issue was further complicated by personal 
differences between Mao and Khrushchev (Calvocoressi, 1982:64ff.). The rising influence 
of  China, its involvement in Africa, its links with Nicolae Ceausescu of  Romania within 
Moscow’s arc of  influence, its move away from industrialisation and Marxism­Leninism 
(as perceived by Communist leadership in Moscow), and border clashes with the Soviet 
Union all played a role in creating distance between Moscow and Beijing (Boggs & Boggs, 
1974:72­75; Lundestad, 1991:242; Service, 2007). So too did national pride, with Lundestad 
(1991:239) noting that, 
… [t]wo countries as strong and proud as the Soviet Union and China could not see 
eye to eye despite their commitment to the ideology of  communism … China was 
not a major power at the moment, but the Chinese traditionally (assumed) that 
they are (a centre of  the world) and believed in a great future.
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To complicate matters, China opened itself  to a rapprochement with the US (Dallek, 2007), 
and the overtures made by the then president, Richard Nixon, closely advised by Henry 
Kissinger, contributed to more tension between the Soviet Union and China. Kissinger 
and Nixon succeeded in the goal of  splitting the Soviet Union and China, despite these 
two countries sharing similar goals. China gained international stature through this 
exercise and proved that it was an actor on the global stage, although in the politics of 
the so­called ‘Third World’ or the ‘Global South’, it had already achieved this stature. The 
ping­pong diplomacy of  Mao and the Chinese leadership’s choice to do their own thing 
were key reasons for the split with the Soviet Union (Dallek, 2007:267­268; Lundestad, 
1991:239, 241).
Meanwhile, in the West, the ruling discourse and world view defined by political and 
military leaders was that the world was caught up in a Cold War between ‘rational’ liberal 
capitalism and ‘irrational’ communism. Much of  this was underpinned by the mentality of 
the US and its allies of  being the benevolent masters of  world politics – global guardianship 
or Herrschaft. The US had been the undisputed Western and global economic power 
since World War I, and its economy already outstripped that of  Britain by 1900, further 
benefitting from the two World Wars (1914­1918 and 1939­1945) which brought social 
dislocation and havoc to Europe, but were never fought on American soil. The US enjoyed 
a certain privilege during this time due to its relative isolation, and status as a supplier to 
those at war, stimulating massive economic growth and the start of  a military­industrial 
complex that would grow in decades to come (De Wet & Liebenberg, 2012:247­249).
Red stars in Africa 
The Soviet Union became involved in anti­colonial struggles and wars of  national liberation 
in Africa, sometimes by choice, sometimes by imposed conditions (Eidelberg, 2015:35ff.). 
By contrast, China mostly followed a soft approach of  infrastructural development in 
exchange for geopolitical influence against the West and the Soviet Union. The China­
constructed Tanzam railway, linking Tanzania and Zambia, bears testimony to this. A 
capital­intensive project, the line was surveyed in 1968, work started in October 1970, and 
the ambitious venture was completed by the middle of  1976. Completing a railway over 
1,800 kilometres through challenging environments from rainforests to near desert was 
an engineering milestone, and the Tanzam enterprise raised more than an eyebrow in the 
West (New York Times, 29 January 1971; Chinese Economic Studies, 1977:27). 
During 1970, the Peoples’ Republic of  China also ventured into less­soft diplomacy on the 
African continent, albeit tentative. One example is the case of  Angola, which lapsed into 
civil strife in 1975 after the hasty withdrawal of  the Portuguese colonisers and interference 
by the US, apartheid South Africa and Zaire, a chosen proxy of  France, Belgium and 
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the UK. Mozambique and Angola saw independence arriving when the authoritarian 
regime of  Caetano fell in Portugal in 1974 and was replaced by a leftist government. The 
Soviets and China supported the Mozambican liberation movement FRELIMO, although 
Mozambique was not ‘a primary Cold War battle ground’ (Ciment, 1997:15). However, 
Angola was to become something of  a test for the foreign policy of  a rising China.
China chose to support one (and later two) of  the three then feuding Angolan liberation 
movements. The Chinese sent approximately 100 advisors to Kinshasa to assist Holden 
Roberto’s Front for the National Liberation of  Angola (FNLA) movement (Ciment, 
1997:46; Meredith, 2005:313). Roberto was both corrupt and close to the American 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Gleijesus, 2002:238­239; Shubin, 2008:45,  63), but 
despite him being on friendly terms with the US, he remained open to involvement from 
China. Roberto visited Beijing in 1973 and persuaded the Chinese to supply FNLA with 
arms and instructors (Meredith, 2005:313), and Shubin observes that this added to the 
highly complex situation in Angola as the Popular Movement for the Liberation of  Angola 
(MPLA) had earlier also visited Beijing (2008:59­60). The matter of  Chinese involvement 
was also discussed by Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger, George Bush, Mao Zedong and Deng 
Xiaoping (Shubin, 2008:59­60). Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping were deeply critical of 
the American government’s support of  apartheid South Africa, and South Africa and the 
CIA were already part of  a messy equation (Shubin, 2008:59, 60). The Chinese withdrew 
their advisors when, to their surprise, they discovered that the CIA and South Africa were 
already assisting Holden Roberto in the field. The situation in Angola was confusing due to 
the intermingling of  colonial, neocolonial and liberation struggle interests, personalities, 
social ideals, and contending ideologies. 
Ciment noted that, ‘[i]f  politics make strange bedfellows, then Angolan politics positively 
made for bizarre ones’ (1997:119). For a moment, the US and apartheid South Africa 
(exploiting the Cold War mythology for their benefit) seemed to work together with 
Communist China, with a tactical consensus on some version of  anti­Sovietism. In making 
a rational calculus, China eventually backed out, becoming aware of  the complexity of 
such a Kaf ka­esque involvement. The Chinese leadership withdrew from the engagement 
with the FNLA and narrowly prevented an international debacle with itself  as the loser.
Angola was not the only case where China became involved. At times, it also supported 
the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) during the liberation struggle against 
the minority regime of  Ian Smith in then Rhodesia (Shubin, 2008:158­159). 
Back home in the 1980s: Lessons learnt, future visions 
A connection between lessons learnt, foresight and the will to succeed through action 
(or praxis) can change a political context from idealism to one of  achievement. Despite 
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human rights abuses and authoritarianism, Chinese leadership through the Communist 
Party managed a collective of  people and made important decisions aimed to enhance the 
economic future of  the country. While there were several challenges and human suffering 
from 1950 to the 1960s, China increased its influence on the international scene during the 
1970s, establishing a platform for what was to come. 
In 1976, Deng Xiaoping succeeded an ailing Mao. Changes were needed and as a result, 
he introduced the Four Modernisations, which were goals to strengthen the fields of 
agriculture, industry, national defence, and science and technology. The plan aimed to 
coordinate and integrate China’s internal and external policies in complementary fashion, 
and if  successful, would see a rejuvenation of  China’s economic power and stature in the 
global community.
The four modernisations were to change China from an actor in the Global South to 
a major force in international economics, and a growing actor in international politics. 
With significant experience on ‘how not to do it’, and a commitment to building a united 
China as a force to be reckoned with, the initiation of  the four modernisations was a 
well thought­out strategy linking domestic challenges and the international context 
with China’s national interests. From an outsider’s perspective, this approach may be 
seen as linking (and perhaps intertwining) socialism and state­sponsored enterprise, and 
complementing this with continuous adaptations to macro­ and micro­economic needs.
Some argued that the new economic approach was not capitalism as seen in Western 
contexts. Chinese theorists suggested that it steered clear of  simplistic solutions such 
as ‘pure’ capitalism and ‘pure’ communism. (Pan, 1987; Yiwei, 1988; Jiatun, 1991; 
Congming, 1991; Wenming, 1984). Lu Congming echoed these sentiments, suggesting 
that a re­assessment of  socialist and capitalist thought could achieve a theoretical, and 
hence a practical, working economy that responds to internal needs and external interests 
(Congming, 1988:25ff.; see also Jiatun, 1991). 
Since the 1970s, and particularly since the late 1980s/early 1990s, China demonstrated a 
strong upward trajectory, with agricultural reforms from 1980 already adding value by 
midway through the decade (Wenming et al., 1984). This was also part of  what its state elite 
had viewed as ‘Greater China’ (Hoogvelt, 1997:217). In the late 1980s, Lynn Pan suggested 
that China demonstrated a unique development trajectory in comparison to Western 
states, wondering ‘Would China become the world’s next colossus?’ (Pan, 1987:238).
China, 1990‑2020: Economic power and the global political economy
Samir Amin argues that, since the formation of  what is commonly called the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ (a set of  agreements between the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
World Bank, and US Treasury Department), the world economy has been dictated by 
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liberal­capitalism through a Western (core­state) consensus, and alternative pathways 
to the dominant capitalist paradigm were not popular (Amin, 2006:168). He argues that 
China and Russia (and other so­called Third World countries) found themselves confronted 
with the dominance of  capitalism, and the marginalisation of  alternative economic 
pathways, namely socialism (Amin, 2006:168). However, Western­style capitalism faced 
its own problems. As the dominant system, it too did not achieve economic equality. On 
the contrary, it deepened class differences and increased the gap between rich and poor 
both globally and regionally (Amin, 2006; Chomsky, 2007; Martin & Schumann, 1997; 
Keulder, 1996; Hoogvelt, 1997). As neoliberal globalisation has spread across the globe, 
characterised by liberalising markets, trade openness, deregulation and privatisation, the 
situation has worsened (Amin, 2006; Chomsky, 2007; Dyer, 2006). Other alternatives 
were needed.
However, questions persisted over the extent to which China was actually proposing an 
alternative system, or whether it was merely repeating the prevailing Western­led system, 
albeit with Chinese characteristics. By the end of  the 1990s, China acted boldly on the 
international stage by adopting its ‘going out’ policy in 1998, and shortly thereafter 
joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. In contrast to its stated ambitions 
of  providing an alternative to the dominant system, there are two initiatives intimately 
tied to China’s global ambitions which demonstrate its acquiescence to global capitalism: 
BRICS, and the One Belt One Road (OBOR) Initiative, founded by Xi Jinping in 2013, who 
prioritised foreign affairs after becoming president earlier in the year.
The BRICS alliance is probably the strongest proponent of  what today is commonly 
called South­South relations, the origin of  which can be traced back to the NAM, and the 
partially China­led Bandung Conference hosted in Indonesia in 1955 between African and 
Asian heads of  state. Building on this, the Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) alliance of 
prominent emerging economies was founded in 2005. The term ‘BRIC’ was initially coined 
by Jim O’Neill from Goldman Sachs in 2001, by which he hoped to capture the prominent 
emerging economies from the non­West, whose markets had vast growth potential and 
substantial populations. For example, in 2013, the BRICS accounted for 42% of  the global 
population and 40% of  the global gross domestic product (GDP) (Lumumba­Kasongo, 
2015:87). The BRIC states started hosting formal annual summits from 2009, and in 2010 
South Africa was invited to join the group, making it ‘BRICS’.
The most significant achievement of  the bloc thus far was the creation of  a New 
Development Bank (NDB) in 2014 to help finance infrastructure projects in the BRICS 
countries and within their respective regions. This bank, along with the China­controlled 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Silk Road Fund, supposedly heralded a 
challenge to the prevailing Washington Consensus. Proponents of  this argument suggest 
that the emerging powers, led by China, are attempting to challenge Western capitalism 
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by replacing it with a Chinese model of  development, or ‘Beijing Consensus’. The goal is 
also to challenge the hegemony of  the dollar with the renminbi. 
However, despite this goal, the NDB (at least initially) chose the US dollar as its preferred 
trading currency ( Johnson, 2015:209), as did the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA). 
The CRA is a framework which assists the BRICS states to manage their short­term balance 
of  payments problems. However, it too resulted in a further strengthening of  the IMF, as 
if  a country seeks a loan in excess of  30% of  its borrowing quota, it would be required to 
take out a structural adjustment loan and subject itself  to conditionality (Bond, 2016:613). 
Some have also questioned the viability of  the NDB with regards to its ambitions and 
extent of  required infrastructure, as it possessed a total strength of  $100 billion against the 
World Bank’s $250 billion (Bertelsmann­Scott et al., 2016). Although the increased use of 
local currencies (not the US dollar) in trade and financial deals is cause for some optimism, 
in short, the creation of  an alternative financial system to substantively challenge the 
prevailing Western­led one seemed unlikely.
China’s OBOR initiative was devised to recycle some of  China’s accumulated capital and 
to repurpose the construction materials based in its state­owned enterprises (SOEs), and 
it was hoped that this would increase exports and further globalise the renminbi. OBOR 
is therefore an amplified version of  China’s ‘going out’ policy that was launched in the 
late 90s to increase capital outflow whilst seeking to further expand the reach of  Chinese 
companies (Rolland, 2017:130). 
OBOR’s land and maritime routes (spanning East, Middle and West Asia, the Middle East, 
Europe and Africa) comprise a series of  parallel and interlinked features, including inter­
continental railway routes, freeways, ports, and energy pipelines. OBOR comprises over 
60 countries, including 4 billion people and a market share of  approximately one­third of 
global GDP (Ferdinand, 2016:950). OBOR presents an opportunity for Chinese companies 
to invest in developing industrial, manufacturing, and special economic zones and parks 
(Du, 2016:31), and as centres for manufacturing, these parks will serve as distribution 
nodes along the many transport corridors of  OBOR. Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
will be the dominant modus operandi of  OBOR, and Chinese credit will be extended to 
Chinese contractors to carry out the work of  OBOR in these countries (Hayes, 2017:1). 
China­employed financial instruments (issued by the Silk Road Fund, Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank, and NDB) will fund Chinese projects in these territories, stimulating 
their markets, and even creating new ones. 
However, OBOR faces several difficulties, not least of  which are the significant security 
challenges. OBOR traverses areas where the Islamic State (IS) has been involved, and 
passes through the war­ravaged Iraq and Afghanistan. The safe passage of  capital, goods 
and people along OBOR routes is also contingent on security in the seas around the Horn 
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of  Africa, and in states such as Somalia in East Africa and Yemen in the Middle East, where 
piracy poses a constant threat. On land, one has to contend with groups such as Al Shaabab. 
There are mixed views on how China should deal with these security threats (Swaine, 
2015:9). In certain quarters, it is believed that the Maritime Silk Road is closely linked 
to China’s goals of  transforming into a substantial maritime power. As Liang (2015, in 
Sidaway & Woon, 2017:596) contends, it is hoped that OBOR would turn the Peoples’ 
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) into ‘a robust blue water naval capability dedicated to sea 
lines of  communication defense’. Others believe that it is essential for China to establish 
contacts and ensure friendly ports and turnaround facilities based in other countries, as 
this will extend the range of  possible Chinese maritime activities (Chaturvedy, 2017). The 
so­called String of  Pearls is a strategy in which China is allegedly attempting to secure a 
series of  compliant ports and installations which would ensure their dominance over the 
South China Sea and beyond. Based on this, it seems that China may be reconsidering its 
stance on non­interference and non­intervention (Mustafic, 2017:117). 
In a similar vein to the BRICS alliance, many have argued that OBOR is a bold attempt 
to insert Chinese characteristics into broader capitalist development as a challenge to the 
Washington consensus. From this perspective, OBOR is calculated as a broader geopolitical 
gambit to challenge the Washington Consensus, similar to the way in which the Marshall 
Plan was a US­led reconstruction of  Western Europe after World War II. 
Although OBOR would signal a substantial advance by a growing global power, what 
is overwhelmingly more likely is that OBOR will fit into the Western­led system 
of  accumulation, particularly when assessed against broader trends concerning the 
BRICS reinforcement of  this system (Van der Merwe, 2018; Van der Merwe, Taylor 
& Arkhangelskaya, 2016). Chances are slim that OBOR will do anything other than 
reinforce the status quo concerning the broader systemic level and its preferred means of 
accumulation. The changes being rung in by OBOR are effectively style over substance, 
or just more of  the same. 
In 2018, China has assumed the role of  globalisation and free trade enforcer, taking 
over this role from the US, whose withdrawal from international engagements is owed 
to President Donald Trump’s trade protectionist policies and all­out trade wars with 
traditional allies such as Canada, the European Union, and China. The single most talked­
about item at the 2018 BRICS summit in Johannesburg was trade openness, and China 
came out strongly against US trade protectionism. 
Economic growth, defence and international status
D’Anieri, a US­based political scientist, argues that ‘China’s booming economy has 
probably brought more people out of  poverty than any global development scheme, 
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but development also contributes to the economic and military might that many fear’ 
(2014:298). Despite some ‘heat­up’ (a decline in sustained growth of  10%) in 2011, China’s 
macroeconomic policies contributed to relative global economic stability, and the country 
accumulated massive holdings of  foreign currencies, including US$4 trillion (D’Anieri, 
2014:298), in comparison to just over US$2 trillion in 2010 (D’Anieri, 2014:308). This 
phenomenon is expected to continue, as the Chinese central bank buys US bonds that in 
effect fund the massive US trade deficit, argues D’Anieri (2014:298).
Chinese expenditure during the 1970s was hard to calculate and estimates by prominent 
economists suggested that defence expenditure could have been US$4–5 billion, assuming 
that China had a 4–5% growth rate. Others suggested US$10–12 billion, while the US 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency at the time estimated that the expenditure might 
have been as high as US$15 billion (IISS [International Institute for Strategic Studies], 
1976:50), although this is likely an inflated figure or overestimation. 
Between 1977 and the mid­1980s, the four modernisations were conceptualised in China. 
During the late 1980s, IISS reports that, despite an economic growth rate of  approximately 
8%, defence spending in China declined (IISS, 1989:147). At the time, the total armed 
forces of  the People’s Republic stood at 3.2 million men and women, of  which the army 
represented 2.3 million (around a million conscripts on two­year stints). The navy staff 
consisted of  about 300,000, and the air force had 470,000 (IISS, 1989:147ff.). IISS argues 
that, given the available budget and perhaps also due to doctrine, the military posture of 
China resulted in a territorial ‘defensive force and lacked the ability, facilities and logistics 
capabilities for protracted, large­scale military operations outside China’ (IISS, 1976:48). 
However, the same publication noted ‘that China is gradually acquiring a greater logistic 
capacity’ (IISS, 1976:48). 
By 2012­2013, the IISS reported that China was making wide­ranging efforts to improve 
its military capacity, mirroring the country’s economic growth, and the Chinese Defence 
Paper, issued in April 2013, stressed that the armed forces should be ‘commensurate with 
China’s international standing’ (The Military Balance, 2014:206). The paper also pointed to 
the need to enhance maritime power. Restructuring, professionalisation, modernisation 
and diversification, including the armaments industry, were prioritised (The Military 
Balance, 2014:207). The PLA was to undergo a qualitative revolution in equipment, while 
maritime power was not to be neglected. However, there were challenges.
Following the ‘overheating’ of  the economy in 2011, Chinese economic growth slowed 
to 7.8%, down from 9.3% in 2009, and monetary policy had to be tightened. The Chinese 
defence budget for 2013 was set at US$112 billion. When defence spending accelerated, it 
was carefully monitored to keep increases in line with the comparable expansion of  the 
overall Chinese economy (The Military Balance, 2014:209). Simultaneously, as China became 
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more integrated into the global economy from the late 1990s, production capacity and 
market­networks were extended. Since 2007, policy requirements were set by the Chinese 
defence industry regulator and in 2014, the active defence force (all arms of  service) was 
set at 2.3 million (army, 1.6 million; air force, 200,000; navy, 398,000), while the number 
of  staff  in the Strategic Missile Forces was 100,000 (The Military Balance, 2014:209). Like 
elsewhere on the globe, large­scale investments were made in cyber­warfare and counter 
cyber­warfare capabilities.
Concerning economic engagement, defence and international status there are a further 
three areas discussed in this chapter. The first matter relates to the little­known entry of 
China into a new ‘space race’ between competing global powers and the associated quest 
for control of  airspace. Involvement in space is also seen as an arena that powers can enter 
only once they have graduated into the league of  developed or rich nations. Advanced 
technological and scientific development and competitiveness are also precursors for 
entry into space, and China scores highly in these spheres. The other two areas relate 
to China’s growing ambitions both in its immediate region but also further afield, and 
the tensions and responsibilities that arise from this. China’s relationship with Russia in 
historical perspective was covered in the discussion thus far, so its regional rivalry with the 
other regional power, India, will briefly be discussed. Lastly, China’s involvement in Africa 
has grown exponentially – both as an economic power and, increasingly, as a military one 
as well. Therefore, we end off  with China’s involvement in UN peacekeeping initiatives in 
Africa, as this appears to be the chosen mode in which China chooses to operate militarily 
within Africa.
A red star in space
The space race, as it was commonly referred to at the time, started during the Cold 
War, and the two leading competitors were the US and the Soviet Union. Expertise for 
developing missile construction, existing military knowledge, and practical platforms 
for development were taken over from a defeated Nazi­Germany in 1945, when German 
rocket experts from Germany surrendered to the Allied Forces and started sharing their 
knowledge of  rocket science. Other Germans scientists offered their services to the 
Soviet Union. The space race between the Soviet Union and the US became one of  the 
defining aspects of  the Cold War era and complemented the search for military power 
and dominance by these two superpowers (Cordesman & Kendall, 2016).
China entered the space endeavour rather late by sending a satellite into space in 1970, 
followed by a successful soft landing on the moon in 1976. Since 2000, China’s space 
activities have developed at a greater speed. In 2009, the Vice­Chairman of  the Chinese 
Commanding Council said that, ‘space is a … commanding height for international 
strategic competition … and means control of  the ground, oceans and electromagnetic 
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space … [thus having] a strategic initiative in one’s hands’. The Chinese Defence White 
Paper (2015) refers to space as the ‘commanding height in international competition’, 
and the Chinese government therefore took an intense interest in preparing for fighting 
‘informationised wars’, as well as developing an array of  anti­satellite weapons (ASAT) 
weapons, i.e. kinetic kill, directed energy, co­orbital capabilities, and an advanced manned 
space programme (Cordesman & Kendall, 2016).
Current competition between China and the US has broad civil and military implications, 
as it relates to power projection, national status, and pride (Cordesman & Kendall, 2016), 
and there is no need to add that a modern and expansive space programme forms part 
of  ‘China’s Space Dream’ as articulated by President Xi Jinping, and acts as a crucial pillar 
of  international prestige. In March 2003, through their Shenzhou programme, China 
launched the first manned mission (Shenzou 5), while Shenzou 7 saw a three­person crew 
launched into space and China’s first spacewalk. In 2016, nine more taikonauts went into 
space (Cordesman & Kendall, 2016), and in 2012 the first space docking took place, with 
Spacelab Tiangong. By 2016, a second space lab, Tiangong 2, was launched into orbit. 
China also executed a second soft landing on the moon following the earlier attempt 
in 1976 (Cordesman & Kendall, 2016), and the landing of  Mars rovers and deep space 
exploration are underway. China combines civilian and military objectives in their space 
approach, and arguably currently boasts the most robust and dynamic space programme.
Petra Ebeling (2016:16) remarks that, in being so advanced, ‘China has become a world 
class player in the field’. Its cooperation in space with Russia is good, although USA/China 
cooperation is at a low ebb for various reasons. Ebeling suggests that China would be 
an affordable and logical partner for the European Space Agency (ESA), which became 
involved in the Tiangong­1 project, and could participate in the latest space technologies 
(Ebeling, 2016). However, Tellis argues that, at its heart, Chinese interests in space and 
counter­space measures are rooted in their strategic needs and not haphazard government 
choices (Tellis, 2007:41ff.; see also Polpeter, Anderson, Wilson & Yang, 2016).
Closer cooperation between China and ESA will most likely become a contentious matter 
for the US. Kulacki (2014) points out that the USA space programme, whether for (deep) 
space exploration, delivery of  inter­continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), ASAT or other 
military purposes, is becoming increasingly hamstrung by financial constraints, due to 
the US’s immense deficit and continued indebtedness to other global actors (Cordesman 
& Kendall, 2016; Polpeter, Anderson, Wilson & Yang, 2016). Ebeling (2016) points out 
that, despite China being a latecomer to highly diversified and specialist goal­driven space 
projects, the Chinese influence is set to grow at the expense of  the US’s prestige. The 
reasonable result would be China­US tensions mounting as the US realises that its self­
assumed world hegemony is being challenged within a context of  its declining capacity.
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Notes on the region 
China is a significant regional power, sharing this status with India and Japan. For this 
discussion, we will focus on China and India, as the two regional hegemons share 
extensive borders. In discussion with one of  the authors some years ago, Shrikant Paranjpe 
referred to India as an ‘apologetic hegemon’. However, times are changing, and both India 
and China are now regional hegemons with a global presence, and no longer need to 
be apologetic.
In 1954, India and China signed the Tibet agreement, while an Indo­Soviet Treaty was 
signed in 1971 (Paranjpe, 2013:72, 74). In 1974, India became part of  what is known as the 
Nuclear Club, and today India has a clear capacity for a weaponised nuclear programme. 
Since the establishment of  NAM, India has always played an important and frequently 
leadership role, acting as a spokesperson and leading member of  NAM. Simultaneously, 
India cooperated with the USSR regarding military agreements and the arms trade.
However, some changes took place. During the late 1990s and early 2000s some closer 
interaction marked the relations between the US and India (Kamdar, 2007:200). Kamdar 
refers to this interaction as new strategic partnership (or cooperation) between the US 
and India, including booming trade and, ‘gave Americans the idea that India is exclusively 
focused on the US’, but cautions that, ‘Nothing could be further from the complex reality 
of  today’s geopolitics’ (Kamdar, 2007:275). Kamdar goes on to note that ‘India is not going 
to play junior partner to America’s military and corporate research apparatus’ (2007:278), 
as India holds influential soft and hard power capacities. The country may not want to 
seem to be leaning towards the US (Kamdar, 2007:200), and remains open to trading with 
anyone on the global scene. 
For example, India seems to be rebuilding its relations with Russia. India participates in 
a multipolar world economy, with trade partners such as the European Union, especially 
France and Germany, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin­America (Kamdar, 2007:277). The 
country has extensive trade ties with the Middle East and countries in the Arabian Gulf 
region (Kamdar, 2007:263), and is an important political, economic, and military player on 
the global stage. Within the region, India and China seem to have found well­rationalised 
reasons for peaceful existence, and little change in this domain is foreseen in the medium­ 
and even long­term. India is aware of  the need to live in peace with its northern neighbour, 
and in November 2006, Chinese Premier Hu Jintao visited New Delhi, where the two 
countries agreed to boost bilateral trade to US$40 billion by 2010, a figure long surpassed.
Soft or smart diplomacy and new responsibilities: UN peacekeeping
With its return from relative isolation during the early years of  Communist rule, and 
given current security developments, the Chinese started getting involved in United 
Nations (UN) peace deployments. By 2014, small numbers of  personnel were or are 
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deployed in Cote d’Ivoire (UN­UNOCI), Western Sahara (MINURSCO), and Cyprus 
(UNFICYP), while larger numbers are seen in the Democratic Republic of  the Congo 
(MONUSCO, 220 members), Lebanon (UNIFIL, 343), Liberia (UNMIL, 564), South 
Sudan (UNMISS, 340) and 233 members with UNAMID Sudan (The Military Balance, 
2014:239­240). Between 2014 and 2018 the picture changed again. From just over 2000 
soldiers deployed in 2014, the figure went up to over 3000 in 2015, then saw a drop, but 
for 2016 to 2018 it remains over 2000. By January 2018, the numbers deployed on peace 
missions counted for 2,634 (ISDP Backgrounder, 2018:3). China became the third largest 
contributor to the UN budget, the second largest contributor to the UN peacekeeping 
budget, the 12th highest provider of  peacekeepers and the largest contributor of  troops 
for peacekeeping in the UN Security Council (ISDP Backgrounder, 2018:3).
China’s involvement in Africa intertwines with its role as a rising global hegemon, and 
foreign policy, defence diplomacy, resource procurement and national interests are closely 
connected. China has become a major economic actor on the continent of  Africa, and 
largely diminished the stake that the US, France and the UK held (Neethling, 2015). 
Neethling (2015:8) also notes that:
China offers its African partners a mix of  political and economic incentives and 
drives home the message of  a win­win situation … (China) increased its footprint 
in Africa [but] adheres to a strict policy of  non­intervention (or non­interference) in 
the affairs of  African states. 
The lack of  socio­political stability or absence of  peace in Africa also touches China’s 
interests. Quoting Wang, Neethling indicates that China’s attitude towards UN peace­
keeping changed from ‘ardent opposition in the 1970s to avid support in the 2000s’ 
(Neethling, 2015:11). However, more correctly, China had little choice in the matter. 
Part of  this increased involvement has to do with economic reasons, as stability is good 
for business, while part is to demonstrate global responsibilities and diplomacy (Wang, 
quoted in Neethling, 2015:11). Moreover, an inescapable reason for increased involvement 
in these operations is to respond to global expectations and UN insistence that member 
states participate in peacekeeping efforts. Neethling makes some deductions about China’s 
involvement in UN peacekeeping: (1) Beijing’s emergence in the field (including Africa) 
stands in direct relation to China’s growth and international influence; and (2) China’s 
peacekeeping involvement on the African continent stems from the need for stability in 
Africa as a central trading partner of  China.
China’s involvement on the African continent is generally pragmatic, and its drive for 
influence is in the main underpinned by soft power. With the spread of  China’s international 
influence, it is likely that China will become more involved in UN peacekeeping, particularly 
in Africa because, from whichever perspective one views China’s growing role, it will have 
to take part in future global multipolar governance. 
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Conclusion
China remains a substantial power in regional and global circles. The latest indications 
from the country indicate that it is preparing to play a greater role in world affairs, as 
suggested by its OBOR initiative, which represents its boldest global undertaking yet. 
However, the extent to which China has the appetite for such a role remains unknown. 
China’s rise has also caused shifts in geopolitical contours which have led to new sites of 
struggle and contestation, such as outer­space and Africa, as well as growing regional 
tensions, and China will have to pay increasing attention to these areas if  it is to manage 
and negotiate these challenges effectively. Implicitly, those who fear China’s rise also 
fear its concurrent military rise, but whether its growing economic and political clout is 
associated with an increasingly belligerent military presence also remains to be seen. How 
are we to interpret this rise, and to what lengths will it go to continue on this trajectory? 
The comparative global experience of  superpower behaviour leaves much to be admired, 
although whether this will be tempered by a more multipolar world is also uncertain. 
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